The Landings to the Liberation
Introduction
Olivier Wieviorka’s Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris, describes the events of an invasion that took place in Europe by allied forces on the 6th of June 1944 at Normandy’s beaches. According to Wieviorka, over the years, the events have been considered to be an epic myth. He goes on to express his opinion that there has been a significant loss in the truth about the events that led to Paris’ liberation. According to him, the events are not well known to many, and I consider this to be true. Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris has its main focus on getting rid of the preexisting myths about the Normandy events and presenting Operation Overload. Olivier Wieviorka claims that the Normandy invasion has been “Stripped of the glorious trappings of a legendary exploit.” He goes on to explain that Normandy’s invasion should be viewed as a human event that is supreme. Its supreme nature comes from its significant accomplishments as well as what was left undone.
Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris
In the first six chapters of the book, German expectations, combat training, the forging of the Allied relationships, deception and bombing strategies, and mobilization of the military are described with broad brush strokes. There are another five chapters where he describes the operations that were carried out before and after the invasion. One such chapter is chapter ten, titled “Psychoneuroses.” In chapter ten, Wieviorka spends his time describing mental breakdowns, psychological issues and the slow response that America had towards the mentioned problems. The last two chapters of his book are arguably the most informative, apart from being so original. They describe the struggle for legitimacy that Charles de Gaulle underwent as he also sought Allied recognition, the resurrection of France from the humiliation caused by their defeat, and the role played by the French Resistance. The book also defines the role of George de Gaulle in D-day and how he was the potential heir to the French government.
More than half the book’s contents dwell on the preparations that were political as well as involving the military which led to the invasion of Normandy. The discussions in the book provide insight into the Allied invasion’s history, which is rarely explained in books dealing with the topic. One of the critical discussions is on political concerns which explain the logic in location and time selection, limitations in planning and the selection of the size of the force used in the invasion. In the book’s introduction, he explains how “the Normandy invasion resulted in a diplomatic Munich” the author provides a discussion that is not only logically organized but also readable, concerning the strategic and logistical requirements for the invasion (Wieviorka, 2008). This is done in the context of operations by Russians and Soviet peace feelers to the Germans. In his work, he presents a wealth of statistics on some economic aspects, shortcomings in equipment, and the strength of the troop to challenge the planning of the invasion, which had a simplistic view. However, there might be some problems that may arise from this, and they significantly affect Wieviorka’s work.
In a thesis statement which he focused more on, he makes an allegation that historians and soldiers are both “eager to magnify the D-day’s importance…”, preferring the heroic charms of the events to the reality which he considers to be harsh. According to Olivier Wieviorka, historians have downplayed the magnitude of the violence that arose from the campaign that followed with the aim of glorifying the rewards or exploits that the Allied soldiers got. He goes on to say that “British and American authors have been painting the image of men who were brave and did not hesitate in sacrificing their lives for the liberation of France and the termination of Nazism”. Wieiorka also pointed out in his book that the cross channel attack succeeding, was far from a foregone conclusion and view is not shared by most Anglo-American historians. However, he does not seem to understand the Americans saw it fit to ally with the British only.
Even though the translation of the book is solid, there is a profound error where there is a claim that the United States had built battleships amounting to 1,200 from 1942 to 1945. This sparks a lot of doubt about the numerous statistics used in the book by the author as a way of proving his points. Additionally, Wieviorka extensively utilizes convenient statistics in proving a given point, and this magnifies the error. An excellent example involves the lack of motivation by the US forces. The high numbers presented together with the numerous questions as to why the topic is relevant, leads to the loss of value points.
The book is riddled with a contradictory discussion by the author concerning the planning and the preparation for what is known as the D-day. In the book’s first chapter, Olivier Wieviorka states that a late start on planning the invasion occurred in the fourth month of 1943. However, he later notes down the date for this late start as of March 1943 which contradicts his first statement of April 1943. Even though this variation is slight, it raises a lot of questions about the credibility and accuracy of the analysis presented by the author. The author makes an effort to discuss individual American crimes that were committed against the French but at the same time providing unequal coverage of the crimes the German forces committed. Therefore, his approach is considered unbalanced. The unbalanced coverage may have been brought about by the lack of sufficient German military documents, but the author does not provide any explanation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Olivier Wieviorka’s Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris, attempts to revise written history in an effort to criticize and rectify people’s understanding of the Normandy invasion which is assumed to be a mythological epic tale. While most of the points explained by the author are enlightening, they are unevenly distributed throughout the book or lost in the statistics which are conveniently used by the author such as the one used in discussing motivation. While the book’s bibliography explains that it was well researched, it is unfortunate that the author dwells on the failures the Allied forces experienced and fails to magnify any success. It is, therefore, sensible to conclude that success is downplayed in the book. Despite the shortcomings of the book, it should be used when one seeks to understand the planning and political issues that surrounded Normandy’s invasion as it provides a lot of information about the events.
